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The paper is dedicated to the study of the evolution of economic institutions in the resource-producing re-
gion, to the investigation of their specificity and institutional traps. As the initial data, the legal framework, 
the experience of the functioning of economic institutions and statistical data were used. The subject matter 
of the research is the influence of regional specificity on the evolution of economic institutions. The research 
topic is the analysis of the evolution, specificity and institutional traps of the economic institutions of the re-
source-producing region on the example of Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug — Yugra. The purpose of the 
research is to identify the relationship between the regional specificity and the direction of the evolution of 
economic institutions. The hypothesis of the study is that the regional specificity has an impact on the evolu-
tion of economic institutions and contributes to the formation of institutional traps. The framework method-
ology of the work is a comparative institutional analysis. As a result, the stages of the evolution of economic 
institutions are determined, their regional specificity and institutional traps are revealed. The scientific input 
is in the revealing of the specificity of institutional traps at the regional level as well as the influence of spec-
ificity on the evolution of economic institutions. The author came to the conclusion that the specificity of the 
region's economy affects the specificity of institutions as well as the formation of institutional traps. At the 
same time, some traps have a system-wide character and do not depend on the specificity of the region; this 
applies to the basic economic institutions. The most strongly the regional specificity is appeared in the evo-
lution of the economic institutions for development, whose institutional traps are in many respects predeter-
mined by the regional specificity. The results can be applied by the public administration at the regional level 
for the development and introduction of amendments to the legislation and further research. There is still the 
question of what comes first — the regional economic institutions or the economic development of the region, 
that is necessary to study both the co-evolution regional institutions and regional economics. Also, more re-
search is needed to assess the impact of institutions on the level of transaction costs of economic entities.
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The development of economic institutions oc-
curs within the framework of the institutional en-
vironment, which is common for the economy of 
any country. At the same time, there are regional 
differences and specific features of institutions 
that have an impact on the nature and economic 
development indicators. Only recently there have 
been organized the studies of the effect of the re-
gional institutional environment specificity on 
the development of regional economies [1–6].
Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug — Yugra 
has a distinct specificity, which is determined by 
the resource-orientation of its economy. The evo-
lution of economic institutions in the region is 
characterized by a vicious circle, where further de-
velopment of the economy demands new institu-
1 © Islamutdinov V. F. Text. 2016.
tions, but their development is inhibited by the 
prevailing institutional environment, which is es-
pecially characteristic for resources-producing re-
gions (the so-called “resource curse”).
Thus, the need to study the regional specificity 
of economic institutions and its impact on their 
evolution in Yugra is very important.
2. Theoretical foundations for economic 
institutions of the resource-producing region
The concept of economic institution is consid-
ered as a part of the concept of institutional eco-
nomics. It is necessary to note that foreign re-
searchers do not isolate economic institutions in 
a separate category, considering the social insti-
tutions in general. The reason for this is in the 
fact that all the institutions in one way or another 
affect the economic interaction. However, the 
Russian scientific literature allocates economic 
institutions in a separate category [7, p. 9; 8, p. 59], 
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and refer to it only those institutions that are di-
rectly related to the interaction between economic 
agents. It is, therefore, logical to allocate the addi-
tional signs of economic institutions:
— regulation of reproductive processes at dif-
ferent stages: production, distribution, exchange 
and consumption;
— predominance of economic sanctions in the 
mechanism of their functioning.
At the regional level, economic institutions ac-
quire specifics related to the climatic conditions 
and the characteristics of the regional economy. 
The resource-oriented economy of a number of 
Russian regions gives additional specific features 
to economic institutions.
Thus, in our opinion, the economic institu-
tions of the resource-producing region are formal 
and informal norms and rules that regulate the in-
teraction of economic agents in the process of re-
productive activity at the meso-level in the re-
gion with a predominance of resource-producing 
industries.
When determining the structure of economic 
institutions, E. S. Nedorezova [8] divides them 
in accordance with their dominance (the role in 
the economy), and separates basic and support-
ing economic institutions. It seems to us that it is 
more correct to allocate the first-order economic 
institutions by their role in the economy, which 
determine the structure of the institutional envi-
ronment, set up the general direction of economic 
development, and the second-order economic in-
stitutions, which are derived from the first-order 
institutions.




— protection of competition and anti-trust 
regulatory institutions.
For resources-producing region, the institu-
tion of economic exchange of natural rent should 
also belong to the first-order economic institu-
tions, since the formation and removal of natural 
rent have been the basis of its economy.
The second-order institutions can be divided 
into 3 groups according to the functions they 
fulfill:
— financial and economic institutions that 
regulate the most obvious financial transactions 
of business entities: taxation, government fund-
ing, lending, leasing, insurance;
— socio-economic institutions that regulate 
the part of the economic system, which is closely 
connected with the social environment: envi-
ronmental management and environmental pro-
tection, organization of labor and pay, social and 
health insurance, pensions;
— institutions for development whose main 
task is to provide the progressive development 
and competitiveness of the regional economy: in-
vestment, encouraging of innovation behavior, 
public-private partnership.
3. Methodological approaches to the study  
of the evolution of economic institutions  
and their regional specificity
Many works of both foreign and domestic re-
searchers are devoted to the study of the institu-
tions evolution.
The article by J. Hodgson [9] considers in detail 
the main areas of contemporary research, which is 
centered on the problem of the institutions origin. 
However, there is an imperfection in current mod-
els of institutions organization, as it is not always 
possible to predict the evolution of economic in-
stitutions on the basis of such models.
Popov E.V. [10] describes an interesting model 
of the evolution of economic institutions, based 
on the life cycle theory and the diffusion of insti-
tutions in his article. This model can serve as a ba-
sis for predicting of their expansion. However, the 
model does not explain the expansion and consol-
idation of inefficient institutions.
The expansion and consolidation of inefficient 
institutions are well explained by the theory of in-
stitutional traps by V. M. Polterovich [11] and by 
the related effect of depending on the trajectory 
of the previous development [12] and by lock-in 
effect [13].
According to V. M. Polterovich, an institutional 
trap, or lock-in effect is "inefficient stable rate (in-
efficient Institution) which has a self-sustaining 
character". [11] The features of institutional traps 
are:
— inefficiency of the existing structure and 
the combination of institutions and the need to 
change something which is recognized by the ma-
jority of participants in the interaction;
— stability and self-reproducibility of existing 
structure of interactions due to a positive feed-
back loop when nobody is interested to change 
something first.
The most popular methodological approach to 
the study of the specificity of the institutional en-
vironment has recently become a comparative in-
stitutional analysis. The method includes the si-
multaneous comparison of the institutional envi-
ronment and economic performance of some ar-
eas, ceteris paribus. It is referred to the regions 
with relatively similar characteristics of territorial 
location and resources endowments. Accordingly, 
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all of the differences in the rate of economic de-
velopment can be explained by differences in the 
completeness and quality of the regional insti-
tutional environment. Abroad, this approach can 
be considered sufficiently developed, as there are 
many training aids [14, 15], as well as examples of 
its practical application [16, 17]. Russian research-
ers have just begun to assimilate this methodolog-
ical approach [18, 19].
4. Obtained results
4.1. Evolution of economic institutions in 
Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug — Yugra
Despite certain independence in the devel-
opment of economic institutions, we should rec-
ognize their direct connection with political in-
stitutions, and first of all — with government in-
stitutions. Therefore, the stages of economic in-
stitutions development in many respects repeat 
stages of the development of political institutions 
(Table 1).
The analysis of the stages of economic in-
stitutions development in Khanty-Mansiysk 
Autonomous Okrug — Yugra suggests that in gen-
eral regional economic institutions have devel-
oped with the same scenario as in other regions 
of Russia. We can only note some lag in the devel-
opment of economic institutions, which is charac-
teristic for all the peripheral regions of Russia, as 
well as a more rapid degradation during the crisis.
The stages of evolution determine in many re-
spects the specificity and institutional traps, in-
herent to the economic institutions of Khanty-
Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug — Yugra.
4.2.	 Specificity	 and	 institutional	 traps	 of	 the	
first-order	economic	institutions
The specificity and institutional traps of the 
first-order economic institutions in Khanty-
Table 1
Stages of evolution of economic institutions in Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug — Yugra
Characteristics
Stages
1991–1993 1994–2002 2003–2010 2011–2015 
The features of a 
stage Institutional vacuum











Budget deficit, default of 
1998, adoption of the Tax 
Code
Oil prices rising, 
accession to the WTO, 
crisis of 2008–2009




Struggle for the 
allocation of the 
region out of the 
Tyumen region
Formation and 
strengthening of regional 
authorities
"Integration" in the 
vertical of power






A large number of laws, 
including tax benefits and 
special programs
Regulating of 
legislation to bring 
it into line with the 
federal one
Detailing and 








f.ex.: the Bank of 
Khanty-Mansiysk
Massive creation of 
infrastructure elements of 
economic institutions
Expansion of existing 
infrastructure elements
Reducing of elements 
number in order to 
avoid duplication of 
functions, severization 




the creation and 
maintenance of 
infrastructure




Fall due to shock Growth 
Stable growth with a 
small correction to the 
crisis 2008–2009
Decline in economic 
activity and outflows 
outside the region
Average index 
GRP, % 73.0 100.2 105.1 99.5
Existence and 
role of informal 
economic 
institutions





dominate but their role is 
low in comparison with 
other regions 
Formal institutions 
dominate. There are 
informal institutions 
for budget “spending”
First "right" informal 
institutions: “business 
angels” are created
Source: compiled by the author.
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Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug — Yugra are prede-
termined by climatic conditions of the region, as 
well as by resource-producing orientation of its 
economy (Table 2).
The trap of political rent [20] appears in an in-
complete legitimacy and in a private property pro-
tection. It is not specific to Yugra, it is extended all 
over Russia. The only real ways to protect the pri-
vate property are government relations and "com-
pensations" to officials, that in fact lead to the 
development of the political rent. The probabil-
ity of an evolution way out of this trap is rather 
small, since it requires not only reforming of the 
ownership but also the reforming of the political 
institutions.
Insider rent trap [20] appears in the absence 
of real control over the property from the direc-
tion of owners of a small capital, and it is caused 
by the previous one. The probability of an evolu-
tion way out of this trap is also quite small, but 
it exists. The conditions for the way out can arise 
under the influence of the sanctions crisis, when 
business owners will have to finally pay attention 
to the domestic stock market in order to attract 
investment.
The trap of derivative nature of business is a 
kind of a rent-oriented behavior trap. Its gist is that 
the majority of business communities are focused 
on the profit through the close cooperation with 
large oil companies or through the "development" 
of the budget. The oil and gas production domi-
nates in the structure of Yugra GRP — 2004,4 tril-
lion rubles, or 74.9 % of GRP in 2013 1. At the same 
time, the turnover of small and medium-sized en-
terprises accounts 335.1 billion rubles., which is 
only 12.5 % of GRP. This trap may cease to exist 
on its own, especially in terms of crisis and reduc-
1  Sayt Federalnoy sluzhby gosudarstvennoy statistiki [Website 
of the Federal State Statistics Service]. Retrieved from: www.
gks.ru (date of access: 11.10.2015).
ing of large companies profits, as well as reducing 
of the regional budget revenue.
The trap of mono-cities is the most specific 
trap for Yugra, although in Russia, there are sev-
eral regions with such large proportion of sin-
gle-industry towns. Yugra includes 17 single-in-
dustry towns of the 106 municipalities; it means 
that almost all of them are large residential ar-
eas, excepting the regional center — the city of 
Khanty-Mansiysk. This trap appears in the fact 
that the Anti-Monopoly Service faces the limita-
tion of its powers in respect of the core enter-
prises and their subdivisions in order to avoid 
social catastrophes in mono-cities. The proba-
bility of evolution way out is also low, because 
it requires the political will of the authorities. 
However, this trap can disappear in a natural way 
at one time with the disappearance of single-in-
dustry towns.
The oil rent trap is also very specific to Yugra, 
although similar traps exist in other resource-pro-
ducing regions. The share of oil and gas produc-
tion in the GRP structure is 74.2 %, while the 
share of all other industries, producing natu-
ral rent does not exceed 0.5 %. Accordingly, the 
amount of formed and withdrawn oil rent is so 
high compared to other possible forms of natu-
ral resource rent (mining, forestry, water (includ-
ing fishing) and others), that no one of the key ac-
tors does not see the need for the development of 
relevant economic institutions for their formation 
and removal. As a result, all other types of natural 
resource rent are partly lost, partly blurred. This 
trap may cease to exist on its own, especially in 
terms of crisis and lower oil prices.
The trap of vertically integrated oil companies 
predominance means that only this kind of com-
panies are able to compete effectively with one 
another in Russian oil and gas sector. According 
to the data of Oil and Gas Department of Yugra 
Government, there were about 60 small independ-
Table 2
Specificity and institutional traps of the first-order economic institutions in Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous 
Okrug — Yugra
Institutions names Regional specificity Institutional traps
Ownerships
Ancestral lands of indigenous peoples, which 
status is not determined; property is controlled 
by groups from outside the region
Trap of political rent; Insider rent trap
Business institutions Overwhelming dominance of big business  Trap of derivative nature of business
Protection of competition 
and anti-trust regulatory 
institutions
Large number of natural monopolies Trap of mono-cities
Institutions for economic 
exchange of natural rent
Institutions for formation and removal of the oil 
rent are fully formed, the Institutions for other 
types of natural resource rents are not formed
Oil rent trap; Trap of vertically integrated 
oil companies predominance; Trap of 
excess return on the oil export
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ent oil companies working in the region in 2009, 
which all together were producing 4 % of oil in the 
region. Currently, there are only 28 1. The way out 
of this trap is only possible through the develop-
ment of infrastructure institutions in the oil and 
gas industry.
The trap of excess return on the oil export is 
seen in the fact that the profitability of raw oil ex-
port is higher than the profitability of its refinery, 
which leads to the orientation of oil and gas com-
panies towards the export and higher prices for 
oil products inside the country. As a result, soci-
ety loses a part of the oil rent. This trap has al-
ready begun to self-destruct, influenced by the 
fall of world oil prices, and in the result of the tax 
maneuver 2.
4.3.	 Specificity	 and	 institutional	 traps	 of	 the	
second-order economic institutions
The specificity and institutional traps of the 
second-order institutions are determined not only 
by natural and climatic conditions, but also by 
the specifics of the political institutions and the 
first-order economic institutions. This is particu-
larly noticeable for the financial and economic in-
stitutions (table 3).
Lack of incentives for the development of the 
tax base for regional and local taxes trap is typical 
for institutions for taxation and tax concessions. 
1 Sayt Departamenta po nedropolzovaniyu Khanty-Mansiyskogo 
avtonomnogo okruga — Yugry [Website of the Department of 
Environmental Management of Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous 
Okrug — Yugra]. Retrieved from: http://www.depnedra.admh-
mao.ru/wps/portal/res/home (date of access: 11.10.2015).
2 Neftepererabotka ili eksport syrya, chto vygodneye? [Refining 
or export of raw materials, what is more profitable? ] Retrieved 
from: http://www.vpkoil.ru /news/2014–09–17/neftepererabot-
ka-ili-export-syrya-chto-vygodnee (date of access: 11.10.2015).
This trap is inherent in all regions of Russia, but 
it is manifested mostly in Yugra. The evolutionary 
way out of this trap is not possible, there is a need 
for a political will of the federal government.
The widespread public finance system trap, 
which appears  in ineffective spending of budget 
funds is very characteristic for budget financing 
institutions of Yugra. According to A. E. Demenko 
[21], the proportion of ineffectively spent budget 
funds reaches 10–15 % in the region. This trap 
can be overcome through the introduction of in-
novative tools in the public administration, in 
particular, one of these tools, as indicated by 
A. E. Demenko can be crowdsourcing.
The rationality trap [22], which is a kind of the 
insider rent trap in relation to the banking sys-
tem, is operating in the system of credit institu-
tions. In the Yugra region, the consequences of 
this trap are clearly evident on the example of the 
Bank of Khanty-Mansiysk, which began to show 
significantly inferior results after its reorganiza-
tion through absorption by the group "Otkrytie". 
This trap has all the chances to be overcome and 
here we should note the efforts of the Central 
Bank of Russia for the rehabilitation of the bank-
ing system.
Another trap that has appeared recently is a 
trap of the deposit insurance system. It is mani-
fested in the growth of opportunism on the part 
of the management of low-capitalized banks as 
well as on the part of investors. As a result, there 
has been a manifold increase in insurance claims 
and related payments to depositors, that led to 
the fact that in 2014, the amount of the Deposit 
Insurance Fund decreased by 71.1 billion rubles 
and on January 1, 2015 totaled (minus allowance 
for payments on occurred insured events) 68.9 bil-
Table 3
Specificity and institutional traps of the financial and economic institutions in Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous 
Okrug — Yugra
Institutions names Regional specificity Institutional traps
Institutions for 
taxation and tax 
concessions
Less than 20 % of the collected taxes remain in the region;
There is a large number of tax concessions for oil and gas 
producing companies;
Part of the income tax is transferred to the Tyumen region within 
the cooperation program
Lack of incentives for the 
development of the tax base 




Chronic deficit of municipal budgets;
relatively large volumes of budget financing Public finance system trap
Institutions for 
lending
There are powerful regional banks, small amount of federal banks 
(excluding Sberbank)
Rationality trap;
deposit insurance system trap
Institutions for 
leasing
There is a state leasing company;
Most leasing operators are concentrated in the city of Surgut;
Most leasing companies are not public
Large costs of the loan 
servicing trap
Institutions for 
insurance There is a state insurance company —
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lion rubles 1. The way out of this trap is possible 
through the introduction of differentiated or cor-
rected systems based on risk assessments of banks 
in the insurance system.
The institutional trap of the institution for leas-
ing in Yugra is a large share of the loan servicing 
costs, which reduces the attractiveness of leasing 
for lessees as well as for leasing companies. The 
way out of this institutional trap may be a change-
over to the attraction of financial resources for the 
leasing activity not on the credit market but on 
other markets with "long" and "cheap" money, as it 
occurs in developed countries.
The specificity and institutional traps of so-
cio-economic institutions are defined by natural 
and climatic conditions of the region, as Yugra re-
fers to the territories equated to the conditions of 
the Far North (table 4).
The trap of inefficiency of the system of eco-
logical sanctions is manifested in the fact that cur-
rent ecological penalties are not comparable with 
the damage caused to the ecology and with the ex-
penses of environmental managers for the pollu-
tion prophylaxis. The way out of the trap could be 
a significant increase in ecological sanctions while 
improving environmental control and monitoring 
system.
The trap of higher earnings appears in exag-
gerated requirements of potential employees from 
among the citizens of Russia to the level of the 
proposed salary. This trap inhibits the develop-
ment of labor-intensive industries in the region. It 
1 Ofitsialnyy sayt Gosudarstvennoy korporatsii “Agentstvo po 
strakhovaniyu vkladov” [Official website of the State corpo-
ration “Deposit Insurance Agency”]. Retrieved from: http://
www.asv.org.ru/agency/statistical_information/ (date of access: 
11.09.2015).
can be overcome by natural means, with the grad-
ual equalization of salaries in Yugra and Russia.
The trap of impossibility to establish uniform 
insurance rates for the entire network of medi-
cal institutions of the Autonomous Okrug is man-
ifested in a forced use of various correction coeffi-
cients to the rates of compulsory health insurance 
for equalization of funding. To exit out of this trap, 
there is a need for differentiated, but economically 
justified common tariffs for medical services to be 
prohibited by law.
The trap of the receiving of "northern" retir-
ing pension at the place of residence is manifested 
in two ways. On the one hand, an employee who 
honestly earned "northern" pension when moving 
to southern regions loses a part of the supplemen-
tary pension. On the other hand, the residents of 
the Okrug bring and register their retired parents 
in their house ownerships on purpose they could 
receive a supplementary pension. This trap can 
be overcome by the introduction of personalized 
pensions, which are not linked to the place of res-
idence but to a specific recipient, and do not de-
pend on the region of the pensioner residence.
The institutions for development are the most 
important in terms of the regional economy 
growth (table 5).
The trap of rapid pay-back is a kind of catching 
up development and imitation trap and is mani-
fested in an effort to profit quickly from short-
term investments. The reason is in the psycholog-
ical phenomenon of favorites — when private in-
vestors do not associate themselves with the re-
gion and do not focus on long-term investments. 
One of the ways to overcome such institutional 
trap in Yugra may be the development of addi-
tional institutions for investment support.
Table 4
Specificity and institutional traps of socio-economic institutions in Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug — Yugra






Climatic, geographical and transport features of the territory;
existence of ancestral lands of indigenous peoples, who have a 
special status for natural resources use;
pollution on a large scale;
a large number of high environmental hazards
Trap of inefficiency of 
the system of ecological 
sanctions
Institutions for 
organization of labour 
and pay
Application of regional coefficients and percentage for wage 
supplements;
rotational method of work in remote locations;
low share of "gray" salaries
Trap of higher earnings
Social and health 
insurance institutions
Correction factors to tariffs;
monopoly in CHI;
weak commercialization of medical services
Trap of impossibility to 





assistance program for pensioners resettlement;
a relatively low proportion of pensioners in the population 
structure
Trap of receiving of 
"northern" retiring pension 
at the place of residence
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The trap of the lack of innovation propos-
als is typical not only for Yugra, but for the whole 
Russian Federation. An indicator of this trap is a 
chronic lack of truly innovative projects while or-
ganizing competitions and awarding grants. The 
self-destruction of this trap is possible, since the 
financing system of science has become more sane 
and efficient in recent years, it means that in the 
medium term, we should expect the growth of sci-
entific and technical potential of Yugra and the 
corresponding growth in innovations supply.
The trap of readily available foreign technolo-
gies is a kind of catching up development and im-
itation trap and is manifested in the preference 
of the majority of vertically integrated oil com-
panies which are functioning in the region, to-
wards ready-made imported technologies instead 
of domestic production. The trap of readily avail-
able foreign technologies is being destroyed by 
sanctions and by the fall of the national currency. 
However, this trap can be preserved if oil compa-
nies find a way to get round sanctions, for exam-
ple, aquire access to the Chinese copies of Western 
technologies.
The institutional traps of public-private part-
nership appear in the absence of guarantees from 
the State. It means that, in a situation where there 
is a risk that the state will not be able to redeem 
some already built object from an investor due to 
the lack of funds in the budget, the investor needs 
for an additional assurance that this object will be 
purchased. However, already adopted law on pub-
lic-private partnership does not give such guaran-
tees as the appropriate changes are not provided 
by the Budget Code.
5. Conclusion
The study of economic institutions of Khanty-
Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug — Yugra showed that 
the specificity of the economy of the resource-pro-
ducing region has led to the formation of a vari-
ety of institutional traps. At the same time, some 
traps have a system-wide nature and do not de-
pend on the specifics of the region; it concerns 
the first-order economic institutions. The strong-
est regional specificity is manifested in the evolu-
tion of social and economic institutions and insti-
tutions for development, whose institutional traps 
are largely predetermined by resource-producing 
specifics.
However, it remains a controversial question, 
what comes first: the regional economic institu-
tions or economic development of the region. In 
our opinion, there is no single answer, and it is 
necessary to study the co-evolution of economic 
institutions and of the regional economy.
Table 5
Specificity and institutional traps of socio-economic institutions for development in Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous 
Okrug — Yugra
Institutions names Regional specificity Institutional traps
Investment institutions
The framework nature of individual legal acts or lack of 
important components in their content;
underdeveloped infrastructure of investment




A large proportion of costs for innovation, financed by the 
budget;
a framework nature of the legal framework for innovation;
underdevelopment and incompleteness of innovative 
infrastructure
Trap of lack of innovation 
proposals;м






the prevalence of PPP projects for development of objects of 
general and preschool education
Trap of lack of the state 
guarantees
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